The hazard log opened at intake, not at go-live

Large acute NHS trust running a patient flow platform across five sites. The programme had passed two rounds of user acceptance testing with the DCB0160 hazard log recorded as to be completed post go-live.

Post go-live is too late. The go/no-go decision is meant to read a hazard log, not schedule one. The trust's own clinical governance forum had no artefact to read at the gate it was accountable for.

A named clinical safety officer was appointed retrospectively at week 4 of an intake reset. The hazard log was opened with entries for every clinical pathway the platform touches, each entry carrying a control, an owner and a test. The log was closed only when independent safety review sign-off landed.

An immutable hazard log carrying date-stamped entries per pathway. Change advisory board minutes cross-reference the log entry for every material change, so the record of what changed and the record of what was assessed are the same record. Independent review means independent of the delivery team.

Governance uplift booked. The trust's own clinical audit picked up the hazard log as evidence of assured deployment on the next release cycle. No incidents in the first 90 days post go-live. Source: [DCB0160 - NHS Digital](https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/information-standards/information-standards-and-data-collections-including-extractions/publications-and-notifications/standards-and-collections/dcb0160-clinical-risk-management-its-application-in-the-deployment-and-use-of-health-it-systems).